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Public policies toward private pensions in Canada and the United 
States share a common history and many current issues. Policymakers 
and analysts in both countries view the retirement income program as a 
"three-legged stool," with base incomes established by public pen 
sions, supplemented by private pension benefits and individual retire 
ment saving. Canada and the United States provide similar tax incen 
tives for private pension saving, and both countries have regulations for 
vesting, funding, and fiduciary behavior designed to enforce and pre 
serve private sector pension promises.
Although basic private pension policies are similar, there are 
important differences. Both countries limit tax-deductible contribu 
tions and benefits, but the ceilings established by Revenue Canada are 
considerably lower than those in the United States (although the differ 
ence has shrunk over the past decade). Another significant difference 
is the greater role for personal retirement accounts. Canadian Regis 
tered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) have a longer history and 
enjoy more favorable tax treatment than do Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs) in the United States. An important tax distinction is 
the greater responsibility placed upon actuaries by Revenue Canada to 
determine minimum and tax-deductible contributions to defined-bene- 
fit funds in Canada. Internal Revenue Service rules, in contrast, disal 
low contributions sufficient to fully fund future benefit obligations in 
many plans.
The uniformity of pension regulations is another difference. Non 
tax pension rules are primarily enforced at the federal level in the 
United States, whereas pension regulation is a provincial responsibility
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in Canada. The result is that it is difficult to compare pension regula 
tions in the United States with rules that differ between provinces in 
Canada. Vesting rules, for example, vary between British Columbia 
and Ontario. Also, only Ontario has mandatory pension insurance, 
whereas all defined-benefit pension sponsors in the United States are 
covered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
Canada and the United States share several current public policy 
issues. One of the most important is the increasing tension between 
policy goals of encouraging expansion of pension coverage and fund 
ing, and of minimizing revenue loss of preferential treatment of pen 
sion compensation. Both federal governments in recent years have 
established minimum funding requirements, but they also have devel 
oped regulations to discourage "overfunding" as a pure tax shelter. 
There also is concern in both countries that increasing regulation will 
continue to lead to the decline of defined-benefit pension coverage and 
its attendant advantages over the defined-contribution approach. One 
of the biggest public policy differences appeared in response to the 
inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s. The protection of pension ben 
efits during an inflationary environment was the most keenly debated 
public policy issue in Canada. In the United States, in contrast, infla 
tion protection drew very little attention. Public policy in the United 
States has been focused primarily on declining coverage, portability, 
and the effect of the pension tax preferences on the distribution of the 
tax burden.
This chapter compares public policies towards private pensions in 
Canada and the United States and examines relevant policy research 
from both countries. First, I review the evolution of private pensions 
and policies in each country. Although pension policies are similar, 
Canada (especially the province of Ontario) has tended to involve gov 
ernment in the private pension system earlier than the United States. 
Next, I describe and compare the most important pension tax and regu 
latory rules. In the remainder of the paper, I examine four common 
current public policy issues: coverage, portability, tax policy, and infla 
tion indexing. The emphasis of this discussion is a review of relevant 
research on Canadian and U.S. outcomes. The volume of pension 
research has increased dramatically over the past two decades and, 
although most studies have focused on the United States, pension
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research in Canada has made important contributions, especially on the 
issue of mandatory inflation indexing.
The motivation for a joint discussion of private pension issues is 
that a comparison of research may shed light on pension outcomes and 
policy impacts in both countries. The similarities in pension systems 
suggest that outcomes of research in one country will be applicable to 
the other. Further, when possible, I try to identify differences in poli 
cies and institutions that provide an opportunity for comparative analy 
sis. For example, a major issue in the United States is the decline in 
coverage rates. A review of Canadian coverage experience may inform 
the extent to which this decline reflects policy changes or changes in 
employment composition. Similarly, the continued popularity of 
defined-benefit pensions in Canada may suggest reasons why defined- 
benefit coverage has declined in the United States. This issue also is 
relevant in Canada, where many pension analysts are concerned that 
regulations will result in similar trends there.
EVOLUTION OF PENSION POLICY IN CANADA AND THE 
UNITED STATES
Retirement programs and tax and regulatory policies towards pri 
vate pensions have a similar history in the United States and Canada. 
Both countries adopted universal public pension plans, extended favor 
able tax treatment to encourage expansion of private pensions, and 
later enacted broad regulations on pension outcomes. There have been 
important differences, however, in the evolution of private pension pol 
icies.
The first employer-sponsored pension in Canada was introduced 
by the Grand Trunk Railway in 1874, followed a year later by the first 
formal pension plan in the United States, sponsored by the American 
Express Company. Although employment shifts from agriculture into 
manufacturing created new pressures for explicit retirement saving 
vehicles, pension coverage grew slowly in both countries before 1910. 1 
The first legislation in either country to encourage retirement savings 
was the Government Annuities Act of 1908, which authorized the
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Canadian federal government to sell annuities to the public at favorable 
rates.
The period between 1910 and 1930 saw the widespread adoption 
of pension plans by the largest employers in the United States and Can 
ada. Graebner (1980) attributed much of the early growth to manage 
ment's view that pensions could reduce labor costs by lowering turn 
over and encouraging early retirement. The introduction of income tax 
systems during this period also provided a stimulus to coverage in both 
countries. The favorable tax treatment of pension contributions and 
earnings that continues to this day was put in place quickly in the 
United States. Payments to fund current retirement benefits were rec 
ognized as legitimate business deductions at the outset of the corporate 
income tax. The Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1926 explicitly exempted 
the earnings of assets in retirement funds from taxation, and the Reve 
nue Act of 1928 allowed pension sponsors to deduct contributions to 
advance fund benefit accruals.
Employer contributions also were immediately exempted from the 
Canadian corporate income tax. In addition, the 1919 Income Tax War 
Act extended the exemption to employee contributions to pension 
funds.
Rapid growth in pension plans and compensation during World 
War II created fears that pensions were increasingly being adopted for 
the purpose of avoiding income taxation. In the United States, the 
result was the enactment of the first contribution limits in the Revenue 
Act of 1942. This legislation also established the first nondiscrimina- 
tion rules to prevent the adoption of pensions for the primary benefit of 
high-wage employees. Employer contribution limits were first 
imposed in Canada in 1947. Because tax-qualified plan limits on con 
tributions and benefits in Canada have been strict, Canada has not felt 
it necessary to adopt nondiscrimination rules.
A significant difference between tax policies is the more favorable 
treatment of individual contributions to retirement funds in Canada 
than in the United States. In addition to exempting employee contribu 
tions from taxation, Canada established personal retirement accounts 
in 1957. Canadian workers were allowed to make tax deductible con 
tributions to RRSPs even if they were covered by a private pension 
plan. In the United States, IRAs were not generally available until 
1981 and were strictly limited after 1986.
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The existence and generosity of public pension benefits is an 
important factor in private pension coverage. Canada first enacted 
public pensions legislation in 1927. The Old Age Pension Act pro 
vided federal assistance to provinces that delivered means-tested pen 
sions to the elderly. By 1951, the view that means-tested pensions 
were inadequate was widespread, and the Old Age Security Acts autho 
rized a flat, universal retirement benefit. Canada did not adopt a uni 
versal, earnings-related public pension until the Canada/Quebec Pen 
sions Plans in 1965. The Canadian incremental approach is in contrast 
to the United States Social Security program, which has been earnings- 
based since 1938.
Prior to the 1960s, private pension regulation was vested in each 
country's federal income tax codes, which established conditions for 
tax-qualified pension plans. The first important private pension regula 
tions were approved in Ontario in 1963, establishing minimum vesting 
rules, funding requirements and, most notably, requiring all employers 
of more than 15 workers to provide pension coverage. Mandatory cov 
erage was dropped with the revised Ontario Pension Benefits Act in 
1965. However, the vesting standard of 45 years of age and 10 years of 
service was preserved. Most of the provinces subsequently adopted 
the major provisions of the Pension Benefits Act.
Significant pension regulation was not enacted in the United States 
for another decade. The Employees' Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA) was more ambitious than the Pension Benefits Act. 
ERISA established standards for vesting, funding, and fiduciary behav 
ior, as well as establishing a system of mandatory insurance for private 
sector, defined-benefit plans. Ontario is the only province in Canada 
that has mandatory pension insurance.
Several important changes in pension law were implemented in 
Canada during the 1980s. In the late 1970s, interest in private pension 
policy grew, as the ability of the public pension system to provide ade 
quate income support for the elderly came into question. A number of 
government and private sector commissions issued reports containing 
various proposals for comprehensive pension policy reforms related to 
issues of coverage, vesting, tax treatment, and inflation indexing. This 
discussion has been referred to as the "Great Pension Debate," and it 
contributed to the passage of the Ontario Pension Benefits Act of 1987. 
This act reduced the minimum vesting period, required that vested ben-
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efits be locked in, and created options for transferability of benefits 
under defined-benefit plans. All other provinces have adopted similar 
regulatory legislation. A major change in the taxation of pension con 
tributions was enacted in 1990, when the concept of integrated overall 
limits for contributions to defined-benefit plans, money purchase plans, 
and RRSPs was introduced.
Changes in pension policy were less extensive in the United States. 
The President's Commission on Pension Policy (1981) called for man 
datory pensions and improvements in portability. This report was 
largely ignored, however, and there was no explicit national debate, as 
compared with Canada, on the adequacy of retirement income. Pen 
sion tax preferences, instead, were reduced in a piecemeal fashion. 
Contribution limits were lowered several times, most recently in 1993, 
and a controversial funding limit was adopted in 1987. In addition to 
lowering benefit limits, nondiscrimination rules also were tightened. 
The primary motivation for increased taxation of pensions was enhanc 
ing federal tax revenue, and the preference of Congress for broadening 
the tax base over raising marginal income tax rates. Critics of these 
changes warned, however, that their cumulative effect would be greater 
complexity and reduced attractiveness of pensions, especially defined- 
benefit plans.
PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARDS PENSIONS IN CANADA AND 
THE UNITED STATES
Among industrialized nations, Canadian and U.S. pension policies 
are perhaps the most uniform. Tax rules and vesting and funding regu 
lations are broadly similar. There are important distinctions, however. 
Most notable are the integrated contribution limits that allow for 
greater individual retirement savings in Canada than in the United 
States and the provincial system of pension regulation, which allows 
for differences in nontax pension rules within Canada.
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Taxes and Coverage
Tax codes in Canada and the United States both permit deductions 
of employer contributions to pension funds from current income and 
do not tax pension fund earnings until benefits are distributed. Favor 
able tax rules clearly have been a stimulus to the growth of pension 
coverage and assets. There is a tension in both countries, however, 
between the policy goals of encouraging retirement saving and limiting 
revenue losses. Therefore, both countries have ceilings on benefits that 
can be provided under preferential tax status.
In the United States, defined-benefit plans cannot provide partici 
pants with more than the lesser of 100 percent of the highest three-year 
average earnings or $115,641 (in 1993). In addition, there is an overall 
limit on annual compensation that can be used for benefit determina 
tions. The compensation limit was lowered from $235,840 to 
$150,000 in the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. Contribu 
tions to pension funds in excess of these limits are not deductible. 
Allowable contributions to defined-contribution plans may not exceed 
25 percent of an employee's compensation or $30,000.
The contributions and benefit ceilings are lower in Canada. Under 
rules adopted in 1990, the old system of separate limits for defined- 
benefit plans, defined-contribution plans, and RRSPs was replaced by 
an overall contribution limit of 18 percent of earnings up to 
Can$15,500. This figure was designed to correspond to a maximum 
annual benefit of just over Can$60,000 per year and allowable compen 
sation of Can$86,000 (Horner and Poddar 1992). An implied contribu 
tion amount is determined for workers who participate in a defined- 
benefit plan. The total of this amount plus contributions to the defined- 
contribution pension could not exceed the 18 percent/Can$15,500 ceil 
ing. (In 1995, the budget plan announced reductions in maximum con 
tributions.) The idea is to apply uniform ceilings to workers, regard 
less of the type of plan provided by their employer.
Both countries also limit employer contributions to fund benefits. 
The Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for the "normal cost" 
plus amortization of any prior unfunded liabilities. However, contribu 
tions to plans having assets equal to or above 150 percent of current 
liabilities are not deductible. 2 Further, the tax code limits the range of 
actuarial assumptions that may be used to calculate pension liabilities.
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Thus, sponsors cannot avoid the 150 percent funding limit by adopting 
a low discount rate.
Revenue Canada, in contrast, relies more heavily on the judgment 
of professional actuaries in determining deductible pension contribu 
tions. In Ontario, the Pension Commission of Ontario requires 
defined-benefit plans to be evaluated by a pension actuary every three 
years. The actuary's determination of the required contribution for full 
funding is used by Revenue Canada to determine allowable deductions. 
Contributions to pension funds determined to be overfunded are disal 
lowed in Canada, as they are in the United States. It appears, however, 
that the two countries apply different definitions of "fully funded." 
Canadian actuaries are permitted to take into account future salary 
increases as well as possible postretirement benefit increases; that is, 
contributions are allowed to fully fund currently accrued benefits. The 
full-funding limit in the United States, in contrast, applies to current or 
termination liabilities, which can be substantially less than ongoing 
obligations in periods of significant inflation.
Employee contributions in Canada are also generally exempt from 
taxation as current income. In the United States, employee contribu 
tions are deductible only in special 401(k) plans. 3 A more important 
difference is the greater ability of Canadians to contribute to personal 
retirement accounts. The overall contribution limit of 18 percent or 
$15,500 also applies to RRSPs. Workers not covered by an occupa 
tional pension plans may contribute up to this limit to their RRSP; 
allowable contributions, however, are reduced dollar-for-dollar by 
implied contributions to defined-benefit or money-purchase plans on 
the employee's behalf. Contributions to RRSPs have grown rapidly 
over the past decade. The proportion of tax filers who made RRSP 
contributions rose from 13.8 percent in 1982 to 24.2 percent in 1991 
(Statistics Canada 1992).
Individual Retirement Accounts were established by ERISA in 
1974 for workers not covered by an employer-sponsored pension, but 
American workers who were pension participants could not contribute 
to a personal retirement account until 1981. Like Canadian RRSPs, 
IRAs are nonforfeitable, fully portable retirement funds. The Eco 
nomic Recovery Tax Act allowed all workers to make tax-deductible 
contribution to IRAs. However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 put limits 
on contributions of workers who were otherwise covered by a pension.
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A married couple with adjusted gross income above $50,000 cannot 
make tax-deductible contributions to an IRA.4
The most rapidly growing pension vehicle in the United States is 
the 401(k) plan. Authorized by Congress in 1978, 401(k) plans allow 
employees the option of making tax-deductible contributions to a qual 
ified profit-sharing or stock bonus plan. Typically, the employer 
matches voluntary employee contributions up to a percentage limit. 
The maximum employee 401(k) contribution is $8,994 in 1993; other 
wise, 401(k) plans are subject to the same rules as other defined-contri- 
bution plans.
In summary, contribution limits to tax-qualified pension funds are 
stricter in Canada. Canadian workers, whether or not covered by an 
occupational pension plan, however, have a greater ability to make tax- 
favored contributions to personal retirement accounts.
Vesting and Portability
Although personal retirement accounts are more important in Can 
ada than in the United States, pension wealth overall may be less porta 
ble in Canada due to the dominance of defined-benefit plans. About 
one-third of all private pension assets in Canada reside in RRSPs or 
money-purchase plans (Statistics Canada 1992). In the United States, 
however, defined-contribution plans have grown rapidly and now hold 
nearly 40 percent of pension assets (Turner and Beller 1992).
Portability of benefits has emerged as a major pension issue in both 
countries, with much of the focus on early vesting. In 1987, the 
Ontario Pension Benefits Act and the federal Pension Benefits Stan 
dards Act established vesting after two years of service, and five other 
provinces have since adopted this standard. Three provinces have a 
five-year requirement, and Newfoundland applies the "10 and 45" rule. 
In the United States, all defined-benefit sponsors are subject to the 
same vesting rules, which generally require vesting after five years.
The Ontario Pension Benefits Act also enhanced portability of 
vested defined benefits. Upon termination, the vested worker may have 
the present value of his pension benefit transferred into another plan or 
into a Registered Retirement Savings Plan. Generally, workers do not 
have similar access to lump-sum benefits in the United States. As I dis 
cuss in the next section, however, preserving the value of defined bene-
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fits depends less upon the portability of assets than upon the interest 
rate used to calculate the termination value, and neither country 
requires that distributions index for preretirement wage growth.
Portability outcomes also are a function of policies that encourage 
personal retirement accounts or defined-contribution plans. Tax policy 
in Canada is more favorable to RRSPs, but many analysts have argued 
that tax and regulatory changes over the past decade are responsible for 
the shift towards defined-contribution pensions (Clark and McDermed 
1990). An indirect, and perhaps intended, effect of these policies has 
been to make pension benefits more portable.
PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES IN CANADA AND 
THE UNITED STATES
In this review I examine four public policy issues towards private 
pensions that have been prominent in the United States and Canada. 
The two countries share concerns about coverage, portability and pres 
ervation of benefits, the role of tax policy in promoting pensions, and 
inflation protection. My primary objective is to identify and briefly 
review relevant pension research from both countries. Most of the 
empirical research on private pensions has focused on outcomes in the 
United States. A number of studies, however, on the Canadian system 
have relevance for policy debates in the United States. In addition, 
there may be opportunities for comparative analysis, which exploits the 
different experiences of Canada and the United States, to improve our 
understanding of the private pension system and the effects of tax and 
regulatory policies in both countries. For example, research on trends 
in pension coverage in the United States generally uses time series 
methodology to evaluate the impacts of institutional, demographic, and 
public policy changes. Since Canadian policies and coverage out 
comes have been different, however, a comparative analysis should be 
useful.
The discussion is organized around four policy issues: private sec 
tor coverage, portability and preservation of benefits, pension tax pol 
icy, and inflation indexing. I present an overview of the issue first, 
describing recent or proposed policy changes in each country. A brief
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review of relevant policy research is presented next. Finally, I discuss 
some implications of cross-national comparisons and make some sug 
gestions for further comparative policy research.
Pension Coverage
The most fundamental policy debates in both countries center on 
the level of coverage. Governments in both countries historically have 
promoted private sector pensions with favorable tax policy. Despite 
these incentives, the expansion of coverage begun after World War II 
has stalled, with cross-section coverage rates less than 50 percent in 
both workforces.5 The percentage of employed, private sector workers 
covered under an employer-sponsored pension plan is estimated to be 
39 percent in Canada (Frenken and Maser 1992) and 42 percent in the 
United States (Beller and Lawrence 1992). 6 Incomplete coverage was 
cited as the primary weakness of private pensions during the Canadian 
Great Pension Debate. According to Sayeed (1984, p. 59), "The most 
important issue in the debate on pension reform [in Canada] is whether 
coverage should be improved by an expansion of the public system or . 
. . of the private system." Most of the commission reports recom 
mended expansion of private sector pension coverage, and one called 
for mandatory pensions. 7
Private pensions in the United States also have been criticized for 
incomplete coverage. The President's Commission on Pension Policy 
(1981) recommended mandatory pension coverage, and a 1988 report 
of a Department of Labor advisory group also recommended consider 
ation of, among other options, mandatory coverage. More recent crit 
ics of incomplete pension coverage have made different recommenda 
tions, arguing for repeal of pension tax preferences on the grounds that 
the beneficiaries of pensions and tax preferences are disproportionately 
high-income individuals (Munnell 1991, 1992; Gravelle 1993).
A particular concern in the United States has been the apparent 
decline in private pension coverage since the late 1970s. Table 1 shows 
coverage rates declining slightly between 1979 and 1988. 8 However, 
these averages mask two significant trends: an increase in pension cov 
erage for women and a decline for younger males. Even and Macpher- 
son (1994) calculated that coverage rates for females rose by more than 
6 percentage points between 1979 and 1988; whereas, over the same
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Table 1 Pension Coverage Rates, Canada and the United States (%)
____ ____United States ____ ___ Canada
Civilian, public and Civilian, public and 














SOURCE. United States: estimates based on tabulations from May supplements to 
Current Populations Surveys by Beller and Lawrence (1992) for private sector and 
Piacentini (1989) for all civilian workers. Canada- Statistics Canada (1992).
period, the coverage rate fell 1.6 points for males between the ages of 
35 and 55 and 6.6 points for males aged 21-35. Bloom and Freeman 
(1992) reported similar results.
Coverage rates in Canada appear to have been stable in compari 
son. Such a conclusion may be misleading, however. First, the source 
of time-series data on coverage rates in Canada is administrative data 
provided by plan sponsors, and coverage rate estimates from similar 
data in the United States also show stable private-sector coverage rates 
over the past decade, at about 46 percent (Beller and Lawrence 1992). 
Evidence for declining coverage rates in the United States has come 
from household surveys. A comparable trend might be found in Can 
ada if household surveys were regularly repeated. Second, the stable 
coverage rates reported for Canada in Table 1 combine private and 
public sector employees. Unfortunately, an analysis of private sector 
coverage trends is not possible with Canadian data. 9
More directly comparable are coverage rates for all civilians. 
Table 1 shows falling civilian coverage rates in the United States (see 
also Andrews 1985; Parsons 1991) relative to Canada. However, a 
given downward trend in private sector coverage would show less of an 
impact on civilian coverage rates in Canada because the proportion of
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covered public sector workers is greater in Canada than it is in the 
United States.
Why Has Coverage Declined? Several studies have examined the 
decline in male coverage rates in the United States. The two most 
widely cited explanations are structural changes in the labor market, 
and changes in tax and pension policy. The first explanation argues 
that coverage declined because employment shifted to labor markets 
with traditionally low coverage rates: small, nonunion firms in service 
industries. Another possibility, however, is that coverage declined due 
to increased regulatory costs, reductions in marginal tax rates, and the 
introduction of pension plans in which employee participation is vol 
untary. The results of these studies are relevant to Canada. Although 
overall civilian coverage rates have not declined, common trends are at 
work. Coverage rates for Canadian men declined slightly, from 53.7 
percent to 51.8 percent between 1982 and 1992, while the coverage 
rate for females was up about 6 percentage points. There also is con 
cern that new Canadian pension regulations may reduce coverage (see 
discussion in Frenken and Maser 1992).
Investigations of declining coverage in the United States build 
upon cross-section studies of the determinants of pension coverage. 
These studies have consistently shown that the probability of having a 
pension is higher for individuals who are union members and are 
employed by large, manufacturing-based firms (Mitchell and Andrews 
1981; Dorsey 1982; Even and Macpherson 1994; Parsons 1994). 
Although the determinants of pension coverage in Canada have 
received less attention, the cross-section pattern is similar to that of the 
United States (Frenken and Maser 1992; Smith and Meng 1991; Currie 
and Chaykowski 1993).
On the basis of these patterns, Bloom and Freeman (1992) and 
Even and Macpherson (1994) attributed most of the decline in pension 
coverage to shrinking union membership, manufacturing employment, 
and increases in the relative importance of small firms.
Cross-section estimates also suggest that earnings and marginal tax 
rates are important determinants of pension coverage in the United 
States (Alpert 1983; Long and Scott 1982; Woodbury and Bettinger 
1991). Currie and Chaykowski (1993) and Smith and Meng (1991) 
found coverage to be strongly related to earnings for Canadian workers
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as well. These results suggest that reduction in marginal tax rates dur 
ing the 1980s may have lowered coverage rates in the United States. 
Bloom and Freeman argued that tax cuts could not explain the drop in 
coverage for younger, lower income workers because their tax rates 
declined the least. When the pension coverage decision is viewed in a 
lifetime context, however, tax cuts should have the greatest effect on 
younger workers. Older covered workers would have little incentive to 
drop pension coverage, but forward-looking younger workers would 
anticipate lower lifetime tax savings if the tax cuts were viewed as per 
manent.
Woodbury and Bettinger (1991) estimated that the decline in the 
tax price of pensions, due to reductions in marginal tax rates, explained 
about one-third of the drop in coverage between 1979 and 1988 and 
was nearly as important as declining union membership. Reagan and 
Turner (2000) attributed about one-fourth of the decline in coverage for 
young males to tax effects.
Even and Macpherson also argued that much of the fall in coverage 
for young males was due to the introduction of 401(k) plans, which 
allow workers to voluntarily participate. Their estimates indicated that 
the pension offer rate did not decline, but that the acceptance rate, 
given that a pension was in place, fell. Note that this theory also is 
consistent with the view that coverage fell due to an increased regula 
tory burden. Under this view, higher regulatory costs for defined-bene- 
fit plans induced employers to adopt 401(k) plans, indirectly leading to 
lower coverage rates.
This result is relevant for Canada, given the generous contribution 
limits for voluntary RRSPs. There is a corresponding concern that 
higher regulatory costs of defined-benefits will lead to substitution of 
voluntary pension coverage for defined-benefit plans (Hirst 1992), 
which could lead to similar reductions in coverage for young males in 
Canada.
A test of the 401(k) explanation for declining coverage would be a 
comparison of trends in coverage for young males in Canada and the 
United States. This theory predicts that coverage rates for young males 
should have declined less in Canada because RRSP limits were raised 
well after 401(k) plans were introduced. Unfortunately, there are no 
repeated household surveys that allow comparisons of coverage rates 
by age over time in Canada.
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Another factor consistent with greater declines in coverage in the 
United States for all workers is the greater decline in unionization than 
in Canada.
Changes in Coverage Type. The structure of pension coverage 
also has changed dramatically in the United States. The percentage of 
covered workers who had a primary defined-benefit plan fell from 87 
percent in 1975 to 68 percent in 1987. A similar decline has not been 
found in Canada: 94 percent of covered workers had a defined-benefit 
plan in 1982, as compared with 90 percent in 1992. Again, a time 
series on only private sector, defined-benefit coverage rates is not pos 
sible in Canada. But, given that about half of all covered workers are 
private sector employees, a decline in private sector, defined-benefit 
coverage similar to the United States would have lowered the overall 
defined benefit rate by more than 4 percentage points.
The shift in coverage type has become an important policy issue in 
the United States. Some analysts are concerned that the growth of 
defined-contribution plans will yield lower retirement incomes than 
defined-benefit plans, because savings rates are lower for defined-con 
tribution plans and because of the likelihood that lump-sum distribu 
tions will be consumed before retirement (Paine 1993). Although 
defined-benefit coverage has not shrunk in Canada, some are con 
cerned that pension and tax reforms, and especially the issue of the sur 
plus in overfunded plans, may precipitate a similar movement toward 
defined-contribution plans.
The two main explanations for shifts in coverage are changes in the 
structure of employment and changes in sponsor preferences for 
defined-benefit plans. Studies of pension plan type in the United States 
have shown that defined-benefit plans are more common among large 
firms and in unionized, goods-producing industries (Dorsey 1987). 
Consistent with this, Gustman and Steinmeier (1992) estimated that 
over half of drop in defined-benefit coverage between 1977 and 1985 
was due to shifts in the distribution of workers away from sectors that 
traditionally provide defined-benefit plans. Clark and McDermed 
(1990) found, in contrast, that only 21 percent of the decline in firms 
who offer defined-benefit plans is due to employment shifts. They 
attributed the remainder to changes in sponsor preferences and argued 
that changes in the tax and regulatory climate have been the primary
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reason for these shifts. A study by Hay/Huggins (1990) estimated that 
administrative costs per worker increased 181 percent between 1981 
and 1991, but only 99 percent for defined-contribution plans.
An analysis of plan choice in Canada could be instructive in evalu 
ating the relative effects of public policy versus employment shifts. 
Two significant differences in Canadian trends are a smaller decline in 
unionization and, at least during the decade beginning in the late 
1970s, a less dramatic increase in regulatory costs of defined-benefit 
plans.
Portability and Benefit Preservation
The primary reason for encouraging private pensions is to raise 
retirement income, but critics of private pensions point out that even 
workers who are covered frequently receive low benefits due to imper 
fect portability and consumption of pension assets before retirement. 
Canada and the United States both have recently adopted policies to 
enhance portability of benefits and to "lock in" pension assets. Stan 
dards for vesting have been raised to five years in the United States, 
and two years for most Canadian provinces. New legislation provides 
Canadian workers with greater portability of defined-benefit assets 
upon a job change, and vested benefits in Canada also are locked-in. 
Although lump-sum distributions are increasingly common in the 
United States, there is a 10 percent excise tax on assets not rolled over 
into an IRA.
Policy towards portability and benefit preservation raises several 
issues besides the ability of pensions to support retirement consump 
tion. Equity concerns arise because workers who change jobs fre 
quently reach retirement with smaller benefits than those who spend 
their entire career with a single employer. Thus, imperfect portability 
may lower retirement income of females and low-income workers rela 
tive to high-wage males. The effect of pensions on economic effi 
ciency also is relevant. Pensions are sometimes criticized for tying 
workers to jobs, thereby restricting job changes when technology or 
product demands change.
Despite shorter vesting periods, benefit losses when changing jobs 
can still be significant. A Hay/Huggins study (1988) projected that 59 
percent of covered workers would lose pension wealth in a job change
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and that the average loss would be 23 percent of the benefits that would 
have been received if all years of service were credited to their final 
pension plan. The study estimated that immediate vesting would lower 
average portability losses by less than 1 percent. Most portability 
losses arise because very few plans in either country index the earnings 
of workers who separate from the firm before retirement. Thus, a 
worker who is continuously covered by a pension, but changes jobs 
frequently, receives a smaller benefit than a worker with the same years 
of service credited to one plan.
Several proposals have been made to further reduce portability 
losses (Turner 1993). Mandatory indexing of the earnings base, simi 
lar to public pensions, has been suggested in both countries. Such a 
policy would eliminate most portability losses but, of course, would 
raise the cost of funding benefits. Ozanne and Lindeman (1987) esti 
mated that such a policy would increase annual defined-benefit costs 
between 6 and 28 percent. Alternatively, portability losses could be 
reduced by requiring employers to accept service credit earned on a 
previous pension. Clearly, this policy could substantially raise the cost 
of hiring workers who were covered by a pension on a previous job.
Munnell (1991) pointed out that enhanced portability of assets will 
not necessarily lower losses for workers who separate. If the present 
value of benefits is calculated with a nominal interest rate, the assets to 
be transferred do not reflect wage indexing, and the worker is no better 
off than if the credits were left with the original plan. In theory, pen 
sion losses from job change could be eliminated by requiring a prere 
tirement distribution valued at a discount rate that assumes wage 
indexing. The Ontario Pension Benefits Act provides that the present 
value of the deferred pension may be transferred for an employee who 
has terminated, either to another plan or an RRSP. However, it is my 
understanding that the present value is calculated using a nominal 
interest rate. If so, this option would have little effect on benefit losses.
In contrast to recent changes in Canadian regulations, defined-ben 
efit assets generally cannot be distributed prior to the retirement age in 
the United States. Sponsors may cash out job leavers with accrued 
benefits of less than $3,500, however. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
required such lump sums to be calculated with the interest rate used by 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The PBGC rate is less than 
the market rate generally used to determine current pension liabilities,
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and thus portability losses are lower. However, when larger distribu 
tions are permitted, sponsors may use a nominal interest rate.
Requiring sponsors to transfer pension assets of separated workers 
valued with a real interest rate in effect transforms the defined-benefit 
pension into a defined-contribution plan. A more direct policy to 
enhance portability is to encourage defined-contribution plans. Some 
analysts have argued that the increasing regulation of defined-benefit 
plans has been purposeful to encourage defined-contribution plans. 
Unfortunately, one consequence of the growth of defined-contribution 
plans in the United States has been increased consumption of pension 
assets before retirement.
Economic Effect of Enhanced Portability. The impact of policies 
to enhance benefit portability centers on two questions. Would greater 
portability increase retirement income? Second, would these policies 
have adverse effects on employee productivity?
Pesando's (1984a) discussion of pension reform proposals in Can 
ada pointed out that economists and employee-benefit experts widely 
accept the view that higher pension costs must ultimately be borne by 
workers, either in the form of lower wages or less generous pensions. 
Whether retirement income rises on average depends upon whether 
workers understand that benefits are imperfectly portable. If workers 
are fully informed and the expected retirement benefit is consistent 
with their preferences, enhanced portability would lead to lower bene 
fit generosity, and retirement income would not rise. But, if workers 
do not understand that job change lowers real benefits, the policy 
would lead to an increase in pension benefits but lower wages or other 
compensation.
Some have suggested that enhanced pension portability would cre 
ate gains for workers who make frequent job changes at the expense of 
long-tenured employees, but Pesando pointed out that this would occur 
only if employers do not adjust the wage structure. If the reward for 
long tenure is intentional, perhaps to provide incentives for longevity, 
employers will respond by steepening the career wage profile. 10 If so, 
the distributional effects will be minimized. No studies, however, have 
attempted to estimate employer and employee responses to policies to 
reduce pension benefit losses.
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The second question is based upon the premise that potential port 
ability losses reduce employee turnover. Several studies in the United 
States have shown that pension coverage is associated with lower quit 
and layoff rates (Mitchell 1982; Ippolito 1986; Even and Macpherson 
1991; Gustman and Steinmeier 1993; Alien, Clark, and McDermed 
1993). Fewer studies have focused on the determinants of job change 
in Canada, but a study by Osberg, Apostle, and Clairmont (1986) found 
that Canadian workers were less likely to change employers when ini 
tially covered under a pension plan.
The pension-quit relationship has different interpretations, how 
ever. Even and Macpherson (1991) found that workers with defined- 
contribution pension coverage, whose benefits generally are fully por 
table, also were less likely to change jobs. Gustman and Steinmeier 
attributed most of the lower job change associated with pensions to 
wage premiums, rather than the potential portability losses. Their 
results suggest that pensions are associated with an efficiency wage 
and that enhanced portability would not increase quit rates. In con 
trast, Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) ascribed the significant 
decline in quits and layoffs to backloaded pension benefits, indepen 
dent of wages.
The question of how policies to enhance pension portability would 
affect labor-market efficiency has received much less attention. For 
some time, analysts have been concerned that nonportable pensions 
would make workers less mobile in the face of demand and technolog 
ical shocks. From this perspective, policies to make pension benefits 
more portable would improve allocative efficiency in the labor market. 
In contrast, most recent labor-market analysis is based upon gains from 
durable employment relationships or implicit contracts. Under this 
perspective deferred compensation plays an important incentive role in 
encouraging firm-specific investments in workers or reducing job 
shirking, and enhanced portability could reduce labor-market effi 
ciency by encouraging worker quits and the loss of firm-specific job 
rents.
I found very little direct evidence on the productivity effects of 
nonportable pensions (Dorsey 1995). However, there is substantial 
indirect evidence that pensions may raise worker productivity. Two 
recent studies have shown that pension coverage is strongly related to 
worker training (Dorsey and Macpherson 1997; Johnson 1996). In
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addition, a number of empirical studies based upon a wide variety of 
data sets have established that pension coverage is associated with 
large wage premiums. To my knowledge, there also have been no stud 
ies of the effect of pensions on productivity in the Canadian workforce.
"Locking In." Proposals to "lock in" pension assets have received 
closer attention in the United States with the growth of defined-contri- 
bution plans. A major difference between defined-contribution and 
defined-benefit plans is that the former typically make lump-sum dis 
tributions to workers who separate prior to retirement. According to 
Turner (1993), consumption of these preretirement distributions results 
in a greater loss in retirement income than do losses due to imperfect 
portability."
Estimates based on the 1988 May Current Population Survey 
showed that 8.5 million American workers reported a lump-sum distri 
bution from a previous pension plan, averaging $8,300 in 1988 dollars 
(Piacentini 1990). Piacentini reported that only 11 percent rolled the 
entire sum over into a tax-qualified retirement plan, while 40 percent 
reported consuming at least a part of the distribution.
In Canada, defined-contribution plans have been less important, so 
presumably preretirement distributions have been quantitatively less 
significant. However, the 1987 Ontario Pension Benefits Act allowed 
separated workers to receive distributions from defined benefit plans. 
To make sure that these assets were used for income support in retire 
ment, the law generally requires that vested benefits be locked in (Con- 
klin 1990). There is no corresponding requirement that distributions in 
the United States be placed in another pension savings vehicle. How 
ever, since 1987, assets not rolled over into another tax-qualified retire 
ment plan are subject to a 10 percent excise tax.
Many pension analysts are concerned that the growth in defined- 
contribution plans combined with the greater likelihood of spending 
lump-sum distributions will lower retirement income. Samwick and 
Skinner (1994), however, estimated that reductions in benefits due to 
consumption of defined-contribution distributions approximately 
matches portability losses from defined benefit plans. Overall, their 
results suggest that, under current policy, the substitution of defined- 
contribution plans will have little effect on retirement income.
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Taxation of Pension Benefits
There is general agreement that the long-standing policy of prefer 
ential tax treatment has been an important factor in the development of 
private pensions in Canada and the United States. However, this basic 
policy has been quietly diluted in the United States since 1982 as the 
federal government looked for ways to raise revenue without raising 
tax rates. A more explicit debate over the advisability of pension tax 
preferences appears to be looming in both countries, reflecting a funda 
mental tension between the goals of encouraging retirement savings, 
horizontal tax equity, and limiting revenue loss.
Benefit and contribution ceilings in the United States have been 
lowered on several occasions since 1982. The Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 lowered limits on the annual ben 
efit a defined-benefit participant could receive, from $136,425 to 
$90,000. The act also reduced the maximum contribution to defined- 
contribution plans. These limits again were lowered by the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986. A limit on 
compensation that could be used for benefit calculation became effec 
tive in 1989 and was reduced from $235,000 to $150,000 by the Omni 
bus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993. Perhaps the most 
controversial policy shift occurred with OBRA 1987, which limited 
pension funding to 150 percent of current pension liabilities, indepen 
dent of contributions needed to fund future benefit promises. This 
change prevented many plan sponsors from making contributions and, 
in effect, required that future benefits be funded with after-tax dollars 
(Ippolito 1991b).
Reduced pension preferences have not been driven by an explicit 
reappraisal of federal retirement income policy, but instead by a con 
tinuous search for additional revenue combined with the perception 
that pension tax policy disproportionately benefits higher income 
workers. According to estimates produced by the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, the annual loss in revenue due to the exclusion of pension 
contributions and earnings was $56.5 billion in FY 1993, the largest of 
the so-called "tax expenditures." This figure has made pensions an 
enticing target for revenue enhancement, especially when a claim can 
be made that taxing pensions both raises revenue and improves hori 
zontal equity. 12
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Many analysts have become concerned that retirement income pol 
icy has become too focused on short-run budgetary concerns, and that 
an explicit comparison of the costs and benefits of pension tax policy is 
overdue (Paine 1993). Two fundamental questions would be addressed 
by such a debate: Do the gains in private pension coverage and benefits 
justify the revenue loss? Are the benefits of current policy distributed 
too unfairly?
This explicit debate over pension tax policy is now being joined. 
Munnell (1991, 1992) argued that private pension coverage is too lim 
ited to justify favorable tax treatment, and she recommended taxing 
pension earnings or assets. Gravelle (1993) also criticized pension tax 
expenditures for disproportionately benefiting high-income individu 
als.
These criticisms have been challenged, however. For example, 
Goodfellow and Schieber (1993) and Salisbury (1993) argued that pri 
vate pension coverage was never intended to be universal but must be 
evaluating according to its contribution to "three-legged" stool. Schie 
ber and Goodfellow also argued that the bulk of pension tax expendi 
tures accrue to middle-income households and that the progressivity of 
the entire retirement income system, including the Social Security sys 
tem, should be considered.
A similar debate proceeded in Canada. During the "Great Pension 
Debate," some labor groups took the position that private pensions 
were fundamentally flawed due to incomplete coverage, nonportability, 
and the lack of indexed benefits. They argued that augmenting public 
pensions is more effective strategy for delivering retirement income. 
The federal and provincial governments elected, instead, to strengthen 
private pensions and individual retirement saving.
Recent changes in tax policy towards pensions in Canada have 
taken a much different direction than in the United States. The 1990 
tax reforms were the result of an explicit debate over the adequacy of 
retirement income and the role of tax policy in encouraging private 
pensions (Horner and Poddar 1992). In other words, changes in tax 
policy have been less piecemeal and ad hoc than they have been in the 
United States. The basic approach was to set a consistent overall limit 
on contributions and benefits for each individual, regardless of whether 
they were covered by a defined-benefit, money-purchase, or individual 
savings plan. This integrated limit establishes a target benefit eligible
Current Private Pension Policy Issues 435
for tax assistance, equal to an annual benefit limit of 18 percent of 
earnings up to a maximum of Can$15,500. Workers who accrue bene 
fits below this limit in a defined-benefit plan or money-purchase plan 
may contribute the difference to a RRSP. Thus, workers who do not 
participate in an occupational pension plan may contribute Can$15,500 
to a RRSP.
Some Canadian pension specialists are concerned that the new tax 
rules, designed to put money-purchase and RRSP plans on an equal 
footing with defined-benefit plans have, in conjunction with the cost of 
new regulations, created a disadvantage for defined-benefit plans (Hirst 
1992). It must be kept in mind, however, that benefit limits still are 
much lower in Canada than in the United States. As a result, horizontal 
equity arguments for taxing pensions have less force in Canada.
Another important difference is that Canada has not adopted ad 
hoc limits on funding, comparable to the 150 percent rule of OBRA 
1987. This represented a fundamental change in policy, for the sole 
purpose of raising revenue. The full-funding limit is difficult to justify 
on equity or efficiency grounds.
The debate over taxation of pensions apparently has begun in Can 
ada. The 1995 budget lowered contribution limits to reduce revenue 
loss. The government has established the principle of limiting tax 
assistance to earnings up to 2.5 times the average wage. A proposal to 
tax investment earnings of pension funds was considered but rejected.
The Effect of Reducing Pension Tax Preferences. The question 
of whether or not the benefits of expanded pension coverage justify the 
revenue loss from pension tax preferences is very complex. What is 
the effect of favorable tax treatment on pension coverage and benefits? 
If tax preferences were eliminated and pension covered declined, 
would individual retirement savings make up the difference? How 
elastic is retirement saving to the after-tax rate of return? Would reve 
nue gained by taxing pensions be used to lower marginal tax rates or 
expand public pensions? Would taxing pensions make the income tax 
code and retirement income programs more progressive?
A number of studies cited previously suggest that pension cover 
age is quite sensitive to its tax price, implying that proposals to tax 
pension contributions and earnings would reduce coverage. A more 
direct prediction is made by Woodbury and Huang (1991). They esti-
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mated a simultaneous model of wages, health insurance, and pension 
benefits, and the results allowed them to simulate policy effects of sev 
eral proposals to tax fringe benefits. Woodbury and Huang estimated 
that treating pension contributions and health insurance benefits as 
fully taxable income would have reduced pension coverage by over 60 
percent in the simulation period. This simulation suggests that a policy 
of taxing only pensions, not other fringes, would have even greater 
effects on pension coverage, as workers would substitute health insur 
ance for pension coverage.
The case that tax incentives matter for the private pension system 
is strong, but whether a decline in private pension coverage would 
lower retirement saving is theoretically ambiguous. Empirical esti 
mates, however, suggest that the trade-off between pension and non- 
pension saving is less than dollar-for-dollar (Munnell and Yohn 1990). 
Ippolito (1986) estimated that at least one-quarter of pension contribu 
tions represents new saving (see also VanderHei 1992). The result 
hinges, in part, on whether savings has a positive interest elasticity. 
Several studies have examined the effect of changes in IRA limits in 
the United States on aggregate saving. Some found that a substantial 
amount of contributions were simply substitutions of other forms of 
savings (Gravelle 1991). However, studies by Venti and Wise (1990) 
and Carroll and Summers (1987) suggested that IRAs did increase net 
savings. Carroll and Summers estimated savings equations for the 
United States and Canada in an attempt to explain why Canadian per 
sonal savings rates increased relative to the United States beginning in 
the mid 1970s. The availability of RRSPs in Canada was found to be a 
statistically significant factor in the divergence of savings rates.
The impact of changes in tax policy on retirement saving depends 
crucially upon how the public pension system responds. It is always 
possible, as some have recommended, to expand the public retirement 
system to counter any loss in private retirement savings. Private pen 
sion advocates argue, in contrast, that one of its principle merits is to 
reduce pressure on public pensions (Paine 1993). The OASI trust fund 
in the United States is projected to face significant shortfalls as the 
baby boom generation begins drawing benefits, and increasing public 
pension generosity seems unlikely.
The equity effect of taxing pensions is also complicated. Given the 
patterns of coverage and progressive income tax rates in both coun-
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tries, a disproportionate share of the pension tax expenditure accrues to 
high-income families, 13 but the treatment of pensions is only one factor 
in the progressivity of the tax code and retirement policies. Elimina 
tion of pension tax preferences may lead to pressure to reduce the pro 
gressivity of the tax code in other areas. Further, public pensions in 
both countries increase the progressivity of the total retirement income 
system. Estimates by Goodfellow and Schieber (1993) suggest that the 
higher share of pension tax expenditures is more than offset by a less 
than fair return on Social Security payroll taxes for high-wage workers. 
The redistributive nature of public pensions may reflect the dispropor 
tionate private pension benefits of high-income workers.
Evidence on Effects of the 1980s Changes. The reduction in ben 
efit and contribution limits in the United States could be described as 
"nibbling at the edges" of the pension tax preference. The basic policy 
remains intact, so it is unlikely that tax policy changes directly reduced 
coverage during the 1980s. 14 Many have argued, however, that fre 
quent changes in tax rules added to the complexity of administering 
defined-benefit plans and contributed to a shift towards defined-contri- 
bution and 401(k) plans. 15 As stated by Utgoff (1991), "It is often diffi 
cult for nonspecialists to comprehend just how complex our pension 
laws have become . . . nondiscrimination laws in particular." Frequent 
changes in nondiscrimination rules appear to have been especially bur 
densome for small employers, among whom the shift away from 
defined-benefit pensions has been the greatest.
The full-funding limit established by OBRA 1987 also has created 
concern. Ippolito (1991b) estimated that the 150 percent funding limit 
establishes, in effect, an excise tax on defined-benefit assets of 3 to 10 
percent per year, with a nominal interest rate of 10 percent. The con 
straint is greatest for companies with a younger workforce and when 
nominal interest rates are higher. Ippolito estimated that, had this limit 
been applied since 1974, funding ratios, especially for growing firms, 
would have been dramatically reduced. It seems clear that this provi 
sion has significantly reduced pension funding. A study by the U.S 
Department of the Treasury found that half of all defined-benefit plan 
assets were affected by the limit.
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Mandatory Inflation Protection
The issues discussed so far have been prominent in both countries. 
The debate over indexing private pension benefits, however, has 
occurred almost exclusively in Canada. The erosion of benefits by 
inflation was seen the principal weakness of private pensions by many 
participants in the Canadian pension debate. Before inflation subsided, 
there was widespread concern that, if private pensions were unable to 
guarantee some form of indexation, the public pension system would 
expand and eclipse private pensions. In response to this challenge, a 
series of studies were undertaken and proposals issued. 16 Public debate 
on indexing private pension benefits in the United States was minimal, 
in contrast, even before inflation declined.
Canadian Proposals and Background Analysis. A 1978 pension 
reform study for the Quebec government first proposed that "surplus" 
investment earnings be used to fund increases in benefits. This "excess 
earnings" approach was adopted by several other studies. The follow 
ing year the Economic Council of Canada recommended that the fed 
eral government assume the risk of variations in inflation by offering 
price-indexed annuities to pension funds. The 1980 Report of the 
Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario, however, 
rejected various proposals to mandate inflation protection, arguing that 
indexing would interfere with the more important goal of expanding 
pension coverage. A short time later, four commissions proposed that 
indexing be mandatory and favorably evaluated the excess earnings 
proposal.
Not all reports supported mandatory indexing. Business groups 
were critical of what they saw as an open-ended obligation. A report 
by the Ontario Economic Council (1984) criticized the excess earnings 
approach. Growing doubts about the excess earnings approach caused 
subsequent study groups to favor a partial or capped CPI adjustment. 
For example, an Ontario White Paper proposed a formula of 60 percent 
of CPI.
This flurry of activity had little ultimate effect on policy. 
Although the Ontario government is committed, in principle, to infla 
tion protection for private pensions, inflation adjustments are not man 
datory in any province.
Current Private Pension Policy Issues 439
Much of the economic analysis of mandatory indexing proposals 
in Canada was done by James Pesando (1984a). A series of papers 
focused on the conditions under which pension funds could provide 
inflation protection and remain viable. In his evaluation of the federal 
government's proposals, he noted that a portfolio composed entirely of 
Treasury bills could approximate a portfolio of index bonds, allowing 
sponsors to promise index benefits without assuming inflation risk. 
Pesando suggested that the general absence of such lower return port 
folios, however, suggests that employees may be unwilling to pay the 
market price for avoiding inflation risk.
In this and a later study (Pesando 1988), he was especially critical 
of the excess earnings approach, which pegs inflation adjustments to 
current bond interest rates, not yields. Under this approach, when 
inflation and nominal interest rates rise, pension funds are required to 
increase benefits, even though their value has declined. Although pen 
sion funds could avoid inflation risk by holding only Treasury bills, the 
real interest rate required by the excess earnings proposal was well 
above the equilibrium rate for such a riskless portfolio.
What is the Nature of the Pension Contract? The debate over 
mandatory indexing goes to the heart of a question that is fundamental 
for pension policy. What are the implicit promises of defined-benefit 
sponsors to employees? Is there an implicit promise of a real retire 
ment benefit? While fewer than 5 percent of plan sponsors promise 
automatic indexation, evidence suggests that ad hoc post-retirement 
benefit increases, which sponsors are under no legal obligation to pro 
vide, are widespread but incomplete. Alien, Clark, and Sumner (1986) 
found that 75 percent of retirees in the United States received such an 
adjustment during the 1970s; however, the average increase was only 
about 40 percent of price increases over the period. A later study by 
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1992) found that fewer plans raised ben 
efits during the 1980s, but inflation adjustment was more complete. 
Conklin (1990) reported that ad hoc adjustments also were common in 
Canada and cited a study suggesting that the average increase offset 
about one-fourth of price increases between 1977 and 1986.
Thus, the evidence is not consistent with a contract that guarantees 
real pension benefits. Periodic adjustments are sufficiently common, 
however, to suggest some kind of implicit agreement. Pesando
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(1984b) and Pesando and Hyatt (1992) have argued against the tradi 
tional notion that the risk of pension fund performance is borne 
entirely by shareholders. They suggest an implicit contract model in 
which workers and, presumably, retirees share in favorable and unfa 
vorable investment performance. The finding that benefits are not fully 
indexed reflects the sharing by workers in a decline in the performance 
of the pension fund.
Evidence for this type of contract is mixed, however. The studies 
by Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1992, 1993) both find that larger 
firms are more likely to provide ad hoc adjustments, consistent with the 
contract model. However, they found no evidence that financial perfor 
mance altered the likelihood that plans would provide benefit increases 
during the 1980s. In addition, strong pension fund performance during 
the 1980s should have made adjustments more, rather than less, likely. 
Pesando and Hyatt (1992), on the other hand, presented informal evi 
dence and case studies to suggest that employees are negatively 
affected by adverse plan performance in Canada, where sponsors are 
required to quickly amortize experience deficiencies through increased 
contributions.
A closely related issue is the appropriate discount rate for valuing 
pension liabilities. If the beneficiaries bear no investment risk, the 
risk-free rate is appropriate, regardless of the assets held by the fund. 
If the implicit contract calls for workers to share in investment risk, the 
appropriate rate is instead related to the risk characteristics of the fund. 
Petersen (1994) attempted to infer from the discount rate chosen by 
plan sponsors the extent to which risk is born by workers. Given legal 
limitations on the choice of discount rates in the United States, an anal 
ysis of rates used by Canadian actuaries may be more instructive, how 
ever.
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1992) raised the possibility that 
slowing benefit increases during the 1980s may reflect increased pro 
pensity to renege on the implicit contract, by terminating pension plans 
and acquiring surplus assets. Ownership of surplus assets is another 
aspect of the implicit pension contract, which is a matter of legal and 
public policy interest in both countries. Recent legislation in the 
United States has taken the view that pension surpluses belong to 
workers and has imposed large penalties on sponsors who terminated 
plans with surplus assets. The view that surplus assets are owned by
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plan participants is consistent with the view that workers share in the 
investment risk of pension funds. Until recently, plan sponsors in Can 
ada could more easily acquire surplus funds. However, the Pension 
Commission of Ontario has enforced a freeze on surplus assets.
Why is There Less Concern about Indexing in the United States?
A striking difference between the pension policy debate in Canada and 
the United States is has been the attention paid to mandatory indexing. 
Inflation protection was perhaps the central private pension policy 
issue in Canada through the mid 1990s. Indexing of private pensions 
has drawn far less interest in the United States. Given the similarities 
of systems and other policy concerns, what explains the difference in 
emphasis on indexing?
A likely candidate is the conflict between encouraging retirement 
income and minimizing federal revenue losses. This policy trade-off 
exists in both countries and helps explain why indexing proposals have 
not been implemented in Canada. Short-run revenue concerns appear 
to have been more powerful in the United States, however. Utgoff 
(1991) described how any policy to expand private pension benefits 
increases the reported pension tax expenditures and, under current bud 
get rules, requires a spending offset or revenue increase. During the 
1980s, the budget rules were informal but no less binding. In short, the 
U.S. federal budget deficit dominated any pension-related debates.
Second, the "Great Pension Debate" in Canada was largely over 
the adequacy of retirement income, and benefit erosion is clearly a key 
factor. The United States has experienced no similar fundamental 
debate over retirement income policy probably, again, due to the 
immediacy of the revenue concerns.
A reason cited by the Canadian Task Force on Inflation Protection 
is that most of the attention in the United States on retiree benefits was 
focused on health care insurance. More recently, of course, the health 
insurance debate has dominated any policy analysis of employee bene 
fit issues.
Consider also that, at the time that mandatory indexing was being 
debated in Canada, cost-of-living increases for federal workers in the 
United States were being reduced in order to minimize the budget defi 
cit, and various proposals were circulating which would limit indexing 
of social security benefits. Automatic indexing—of retirement benefits
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or the tax code—was viewed quite negatively by much of Congress, as 
part of the entitlement "problem." No doubt contributing to this per 
ception was the "double-indexing" of Social Security benefits during 
the 1970s, which contributed to the solvency problems of the OASI 
trust fund and created very unpleasant transitional problems.
Finally, comparison of the policy debate in both countries gives the 
impression that there is greater consensus in Canada for an active gov 
ernment role in guaranteeing retirement income. A frequently voiced 
concern in Canada was that, unless private pensions could do a better 
job of providing inflation protection, indexed government pensions 
would be likely to expand. In the United States, expansion of the 
Social Security to overcome perceived deficiencies in private pensions 
seems quite unlikely. If anything, private pensions are seen as reduc 
ing the pressure to increase Social Security benefits.
CONCLUSIONS
The policy stance of the governments of Canada and the United 
States towards private pensions is similar. Both view private pensions 
as a primary source of retirement income, along with public pensions 
and individual saving. Tax and regulatory policies are fundamentally 
the same in each country. There are small, but important, differences 
however. One of the most important is that contribution limits are inte 
grated and lower in Canada than they are in the United States. The 
integrated limits establish a greater ability to save for retirement out 
side of an employer-sponsored plan in Canada. The lower overall lim 
its in Canada also have resulted in an absence of nondiscrimination 
rules; the complexity of these rules is cited as an important factor in 
declining defined-benefit coverage in the United States, especially 
among small employers.
The most significant portability policy difference is that preretire 
ment distributions are locked-in in Canada, whereas they only are sub 
ject to a penalty tax in the United States. This is important because the 
consumption of lump-sum distributions has created fears that the shift 
towards defined-contribution plans threatens basic retirement income.
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Canada and the United States share most current pension policy 
issues. The most basic policy issue facing both countries over the next 
decade is pension coverage and, in particular, the appropriate role of 
tax and regulatory policy. There is a fundamental tension in both coun 
tries between the goals of encouraging private pension coverage and 
benefits and minimizing revenue losses. This conflict already has pro 
duced significant effects on pension outcomes in the United States. A 
more explicit debate on fundamental pension tax policy appears to be 
developing in Canada and the United States. In both countries, the 
sides will be drawn between those who believe private pensions are 
fundamentally flawed and favor the expansion of public pensions, and 
advocates who view private pensions as an essential leg of the retire 
ment "stool." Such an explicit debate would be welcome, especially in 
the United States, where recent tax policy has been driven by short-run 
revenue concerns with little regard to impacts on the retirement income 
system.
The two most important trends in coverage in the United States are 
a decline in overall private sector coverage, especially for young males, 
and the dramatic fall in the relative share of coverage provided by 
defined-benefit plans. An unresolved question is whether or not Can 
ada is experiencing similar trends. There has not been an overall 
decline in coverage rates in Canada; however, current data cannot 
address whether there has been a similar large drop in private sector 
coverage for young males, a drop that has been driving the falling cov 
erage in the United States. A comparison of coverage trends for young 
males would be helpful in evaluating the importance of policy changes 
versus employment shifts since there have been differences in the latter 
between the two countries.
A time-series for private sector, defined-benefit coverage is not 
available in Canada; however, it is clear that coverage shifts have been 
much greater in the United States. Again, a comparative analysis may 
shed light on the causes of this trend. A theory of the decline in 
defined-benefit coverage is that it reflects shifts in employment away 
from large, unionized, manufacturing firms. However, Canada has had 
similar shifts, with the exception that unionization rates have fallen 
less. If the shift to defined-contribution plans has been primarily a 
result of changes in tax and regulatory policies, the United States expe 
rience may be relevant in Canada. There is concern that recent regula-
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tory changes in conjunction with expanded contribution limits for 
RRSPs may cause a similar drop in defined-benefit coverage there.
Finally, my overall impression is that there is a greater consensus 
for regulation of pension outcomes in Canada. Canada had earlier and 
stricter vesting standards than the United States and does not allow 
workers to consume vested benefits. Most recently, the seriousness of 
the debate over mandatory indexing stands in contrast to the lack of 
interest in regulating inflation protection in the United States.
Notes
The author wishes to thank Keith Horner for many helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper.
1. The most extensive survey of early pension coverage combined data from the 
United States and Canada (Latimer 1932) It is likely that early trends were simi 
lar in both countries, however According to Ezra (1983), the introduction of pen 
sions in Canada resulted primarily from decisions of firms headquartered in the 
United States.
2. Contributions to these "overfunded" plans are subject to a 10 percent excise tax.
3. While most mandatory contributions are not deductible, interest earnings do accu 
mulate tax-free.
4. However, each working spouse may make up to a $2,000 nondeductible contribu 
tion, and the investment earnings are not subject to taxation.
5. Cross-section coverage rates understate the percentage of workers who earn credit 
for pension benefits at some point in their career, due to the typical life cycle pat 
tern of coverage. Tabulations reported by Goodfellow and Schieber (1993) tabu 
lations from the March 1991 Current Population Survey showed that 61 percent of 
all persons aged 45 to 59, whether working or not, were either participating or 
receiving benefits from a private pension plan in the United States.
6. Estimates of private sector coverage rates can vary significantly in each country. 
One reason is different databases. The Frenken and Maser estimate is based upon 
the 1989 Labour Market Activity Survey. Other coverage rates estimates for Can 
ada are derived from a biennial plan sponsor survey. The latter, however, do not 
allow an estimate of private sector coverage. In the United States, several surveys 
and methodologies are used to calculate coverage rates, and the estimates differ 
by definition of coverage, public versus private sector, and other factors. See 
Doescher (1994) for a comprehensive discussion and comparison of differences in 
pension coverage statistics in the United States.
7. See Sayeed (1984) for a review of pension commission recommendations. Only 
the Canadian Labour Congress opposed expanded private coverage, favoring 
expansion of public pensions instead.
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8. The extent to which coverage has declined in the United States is a matter of some 
debate. Other surveys have shown a larger drop in coverage; for example, see 
Parsons (1994). In contrast, establishment surveys have indicated constant cover 
age rates (Beller and Lawrence 1992). In general, comparisons of coverage and 
trends are quite sensitive to the form of the survey question and population defini 
tion. See Doescher (1994) for a review of pension coverage surveys in the United 
States. Since different surveys yield different results, even with the United States, 
international comparisons of coverage rates should be undertaken with great care.
9. Turner and Dailey (1990) estimate that Canadian private sector coverage rates 
were unchanged between 1970 and 1988. Their figure of 28 percent coverage, 
however, is well below the estimate of 39 percent reported by Frenken and Maser 
(1992).
10. However, as noted by Ippohto (1991a), a steepened career wage is a less efficient 
vehicle for delivering deferred compensation incentives than is a pension.
11. Samwick and Skinner (1994) pointed out, however, that workers may use these 
distributions to purchase consumer durables or to pay down debt, which will 
increase retirement resources. Workers obtain no benefit from portability losses.
12. For example, during the debate on TEFRA, Congressional staff generally referred 
to the reduction in compensation limits as "loophole closers."
13. However, as pointed out by Schieber (1990), the share of tax expenditures always 
is more skewed than the share of pension benefits, given that higher income fami 
lies face greater marginal tax rates. A dollar of benefits provides a larger tax ben 
efit to families with greater tax liability. He also estimated that more than half of 
the benefits accrue to families with incomes less than $50,000 per year.
14. However, as noted above, the decline in marginal income tax rates may have had 
an important effect.
15. As discussed above, the growing popularity of 401(k) plans may have been an 
important factor in declining coverage. To the extent that tax and regulatory 
changes encouraged the adoption of these plans, these policies have indirectly 
reduced pension coverage.
16. A chronology of recommendations from no fewer than 12 study groups is pro 
vided by the Ontario Economic Council (1988).
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